Foreign Policy
This domino theory was a part of the greater American communist fear, and led to an increased aggressive foreign domination. This is evident, when in the lead up to the elections, Bao Dai became an unfit leader to promote democratic values, and despite French protests against his unsuitability, Ngo Dinh Diem was pushed into the spotlight by the American’s as a potential candidate for leadership. This was because, as agreed by qualified historians and academics, Jennifer Llewellyn, Jim Southey and Steve Thompson, “...he had three attributes that appealed to the US: he was Christian, he was vehemently anti-communist, and they knew him. If America was to secure South Vietnam, they needed a leader they could trust and work with.” (Alpha History, 2013). The interference of the U.S. and how Diem was clearly part of a puppet government used by the Americans in order to avoid communism, meant that if anything, dislike increased for democratic in the South, as they saw how the Americans were dominating the Southern leadership. Therefore, support still lay with Ho Chi Minh, despite America’s best efforts.
“...he had three attributes that appealed to the US: he was Christian, he was vehemently anti-communist, and they knew him. If America was to secure South Vietnam, they needed a leader they could trust and work with.”
Find out more about why America became involved in the war! Click on the link here!
It was clear that the American desperation of the situation increased, and even though they were reluctant to commit troops, anti-communist and domino theory beliefs began to shape their actions and influence foreign policies. President John F Kennedy could see that support against communism was needed for South Vietnam, and as a result, as stated on the JFK Presidential Library and Museum, containing extensive research and study into the president stated that he, “...accelerated the flow of American aid and gradually increased U.S. military advisers to more than 16,000.” (JFK Library, 2013) This is supported by Andrew Field, a PCGE and BA holder in History at Durham University, who states, “John F Kennedy... helped equip the South Vietnam Army by spending $270 million in military support.” (Field, 2007).
Watch this video that illustrates support for the Domino Theory!
After Kennedy’s assassination, President Lyndon Johnson came to power. He held no qualms in providing the greatest amount of assistance possible to South Vietnam, and the situation in Vietnam worsened due to the Gulf of Tonkin Incident when Johnson claimed that the North Vietnamese had twice attacked American naval fleets in the Gulf of Tonkin, increasing America’s aggressive foreign domination. Johnson’s resolution to this was by sending in the first US troops to combat, and ultimately led to full scale American involvement. (ushistory.org, 2013). This can be seen in the Tonkin Bay Resolution, showing the US Congresses support for the presidents decision which states, “...naval units of the communist regime in Vietnam... have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels... the congress approves and supports the determination of the President... to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” (Halsall, 2011). The two largest communist powers during the Cold War, the Soviet Union (USSR) and the People’s Republic of China lent military and moral support to the North Vietnamese.
Listen to President Johnson explain the Gulf of Tonkin Incident below!
Sources
Field, A., 2007. Britain's Changing Role in the World Vietnam War. [Online]
Available at: http://www.schoolhistory.co.uk/gcselinks/british/world/vietnam/getinvolved.pdf [Accessed 2 November 2013].
Halsall, P., 2011. Modern History Sourcebook: The Tonkin Bay Resolution, 1964.[Online] Available at: http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/1964Tonkinbay.asp [Accessed 2 November 2013].
Hardcastle, N., 2005. Vietnam 1954-1965. [Online] Available at: http://www.dhahranbritish.com/history/A15_Viet5465.htm [Accessed 2 November 2013].
Herring, G. C., 2004. Oxford Journals Organisation of American Historians. OAH Magazine, 18(5), pp. 18-21.
Llewellyn, J., Southey, J. & Thompson, S., 2013. Ngo Dinh Diem. [Online] Available at: http://alphahistory.com/vietnam/ngo-dinh-diem/ [Accessed 2013 November 15].
ushistory.org, 2013. 55. The Vietnam War. [Online] Available at: http://www.ushistory.org/us/55.asp [Accessed 3 November 2013].
Westheider, J. E., 2007. The Vietnam War. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group.
Wiretap, 1997. Two Letters to Ngo Dinh Diem. [Online] Available at: http://wiretap.area.com/Gopher/Gov/US-History/Vietnam/diem-letters.txt [Accessed 3 November 2013].
Halsall, P., 2011. Modern History Sourcebook: The Tonkin Bay Resolution, 1964.[Online] Available at: http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/1964Tonkinbay.asp [Accessed 2 November 2013].
Hardcastle, N., 2005. Vietnam 1954-1965. [Online] Available at: http://www.dhahranbritish.com/history/A15_Viet5465.htm [Accessed 2 November 2013].
Herring, G. C., 2004. Oxford Journals Organisation of American Historians. OAH Magazine, 18(5), pp. 18-21.
Llewellyn, J., Southey, J. & Thompson, S., 2013. Ngo Dinh Diem. [Online] Available at: http://alphahistory.com/vietnam/ngo-dinh-diem/ [Accessed 2013 November 15].
ushistory.org, 2013. 55. The Vietnam War. [Online] Available at: http://www.ushistory.org/us/55.asp [Accessed 3 November 2013].
Westheider, J. E., 2007. The Vietnam War. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group.
Wiretap, 1997. Two Letters to Ngo Dinh Diem. [Online] Available at: http://wiretap.area.com/Gopher/Gov/US-History/Vietnam/diem-letters.txt [Accessed 3 November 2013].